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INTRODUCTION 
In the early days of awareness regarding the current foreclosure crisis, 
industry experts and observers suggested that the foreclosure problem was 
limited to a few areas like the Midwest, California, Florida, and Arizona.1  
These experts and observers questioned the data2 and predicted that the 
economy would improve by the end of 2007.3  Even then, some in the fed-
eral government like Sheila Bair, Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insur-
 
∗ Yale Law School Research Scholar in Law, Ludwig Community Development Fellow, and 
Selma M. Levine Clinical Lecturer in Law. 
 1. Maya Roney, Is the Foreclosure Crisis Real, BLOOMBERG BUS.WK. (June 14, 2007, 
8:45 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2007/db20070614_83 
8245.htm. 
 2. See Organization Accused of Plumping Foreclosure Numbers for News Media and 
Congress, EFINANCEDIRECTORY (July 30, 2007), http://efinancedirectory.com/articles/ 
Organization_Accused_of_Plumping_Foreclosure_Numbers_for_News_Media_and_ 
Congress.html (noting that many economists believed the foreclosures number of 2007 to be 
“overstated”). 
 3. See John Kroll, Foreclosure Prediction for 2008: 1.4 Million Homeowners, PLAIN 
DEALER BLOG (Nov. 27, 2007, 5:00 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/pdworld/2007/11/ 
foreclosure_prediction_for_200.html (predicting that the crisis will not get worse than 2007 
for the Midwest). 
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ance Corporation (FDIC), recognized the need for quick action to reduce 
the number of foreclosures.4  Unfortunately, federal responses were and 
continue to be insufficient.  As Julia Gordon at the Center for Responsible 
Lending explained in her congressional testimony in October 2010: 
“Things did not need to be this bad.  If the Bush Administration had moved 
quickly back in 2007, or if the Obama Administration and Congress had 
acted more forcefully in early 2009, we could have significantly limited the 
breadth and depth of the foreclosure crisis.”5 
Instead of abating, the foreclosure crisis has turned into an economic cri-
sis.  Today, job loss now pushes many homeowners with prime mortgages 
into foreclosure,6 while continuing market decline leaves others owing 
more on their mortgages than their homes are worth.  Current estimates 
have twenty-five percent of houses “underwater,” and some analysts pre-
dict as much as forty-eight percent of all residential properties nationwide 
will have a negative equity between their mortgage balances and their 
property values before the housing market recovers.7 
A major challenge has been the unwillingness of servicers to modify at-
risk and delinquent mortgages early, appropriately, and on a large enough 
scale to contain the crisis.  The federal government has been unsuccessful 
to date in motivating servicers to make the kinds of changes to mortgages 
that would make them affordable in the long-term to homeowners.8  As 
 
 4. Les Christie, FDIC Chief: Intervene on Foreclosures, CNNMONEY.COM (Dec. 2, 
2008, 8:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/02/real_estate/Bair_on_bailouts/index.htm; 
see also Sheila C. Bair, Editorial, Fix Rates to Save Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/19/opinion/19bair.html (discussing the need for action to 
minimize foreclosures). 
 5. HAMP, Servicer Abuses, and Foreclosure Prevention Strategies: Hearing Before 
the Cong. Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Julia Gordon, Senior Policy Counsel, Center for Re-
sponsible Lending), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-102710-gordon 
.pdf. 
 6. Alissa Figueroa, Foreclosure Crisis Phase 2: The Negative Equity Dilemma, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 12, 2010, 9:36 AM), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2010/ 
0712/Foreclosure-crisis-phase-2-The-negative-equity-dilemma (“[N]early 2.4 million Amer-
icans with prime loans are seriously delinquent on their mortgages.”). 
 7. Karen Weaver & Ying Shen, Drowning in Debt, DEUTSCHE BANK (Aug. 5, 2009), 
http://www.virtualbroker.com/2009/08/drowning-in-debt.html (follow link to PDF). 
 8. In its June 2010 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office detailed several 
shortcomings in the U.S. Treasury’s oversight of servicers and servicers’ treatment of bor-
rowers. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-634, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM: FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY AND EQUITABLY IMPLEMENT FORECLOSURE 
MITIGATION PROGRAMS (2010); see also U.S. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR 
THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP-10-005, FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 12-14 (2010) [hereinafter 
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Gordon noted, “the government put forth a series of initiatives that relied 
on voluntary actions from servicers in return for targeted monetary incen-
tives.  In evaluating how well this approach has worked, the facts speak for 
themselves.”9 
These challenges and other policy failures should have been aggressive-
ly addressed early in the crisis.  They were not.  Is the federal government 
too far removed from a feedback loop on its own policies?  Or, is the in-
formation getting in but no one is acting on it?  The challenge of gathering 
and interpreting accurate feedback from local sources at the national level 
may seem insurmountable.  Without such a feedback loop, however, feder-
al programs cannot adjust and will ultimately be minimally effective, par-
ticularly in areas like housing markets that are so locally determined.  I 
have been both an actor on the local level, trying to address the crisis, and 
an observer of the failure of federal policies to effectively respond to the 
crisis.10  In the last two quarters of 2010, I also had the privilege of work-
ing on a collaborative process using lessons learned at the local level to as-
sess existing policies and develop recommendations for new policies to ad-
dress this continuing crisis.  This essay is a reflection on the power of this 
 
SIGTARP, FACTORS AFFECTING HAMP IMPLEMENTATION] (discussing resistance by servic-
ers to government efforts to achieve principal reductions). 
 9. Hearing, supra note 5, at 12; see also Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Federal Home 
Mortgage Modification Efforts During the Financial Crisis (Oct. 15, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (presented at the Fordham Urban Law Journal 2010 Cooper-Walsh Collo-
quium) (“[T]he resistance to permanent modifications may also be the product of accounting 
rules that require immediate write-downs for reductions in interest rates or principal that are 
permanent in nature, rather than temporary . . . . If the latter is the case, then stronger medi-
cine will be needed.  Short of overhauling the accounting rules—which raises larger compli-
cations of its own—the government’s options are limited.  Either it will have to further sub-
sidize losses arising from write-downs, compel write downs by law, or encourage voluntary 
write-downs through stronger means, including the threat of bankruptcy cram-downs or 
slower access to foreclosure court.”).  At the time of the Colloquium, Professor McCoy was 
the Connecticut Mutual Professor of Law and Director of the Insurance Law Center at the 
University of Connecticut.  However, she had already been hired to build the division of the 
new federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that will concentrate on protecting con-
sumers against mortgage fraud and in their dealings with mortgage lenders and servicers. 
 10. A major stumbling block to aggressive action by federal actors (both legislators and 
government officials) centers on concerns about “moral hazard.”  If servicers are “required” 
to take more drastic steps to allow homeowners (who may have “bought more house than 
they could afford”) to stay in their homes (i.e., principal reductions tied to actual property 
value), what about those homeowners who successfully struggled to continue to pay their 
mortgage?  One observer suggests that, even if moral hazard should have been considered 
when most homeowners impacted had subprime mortgages, the same is not true now when 
prime mortgage holders are suffering from the results of the economic crisis. See David 
Coates, The Foreclosure Crisis That Will Not Go Away, TALKINGPOINTSMEMO.COM (Aug. 
1, 2010, 6:10 PM), http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/c/o/coatesd/2010/08/ 
the-foreclosure-crisis-that-wi.php. 
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collaborative process and the potential to use such processes to engage and 
inform federal actors.11 
This essay starts by examining the role of “local”—or, more accurately, 
the absence of such a role—in the lead up to the crisis.  It then looks at the 
return of the local focus in the responses to the crisis and how these res-
ponses served as testing grounds for federal policy initiatives.  The essay 
looks closely at one local response in particular—the Real Options, Over-
coming Foreclosure (ROOF) project in New Haven, Connecticut.12  Then, 
focusing on just one example, the role of the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) certified counselors, the essay describes 
how local efforts quickly revealed the challenges that have stymied the ef-
ficacy of federal responses to the crisis.13 
The essay then describes a recent example of a policy development ex-
ercise that built on and integrated lessons learned through local work.  The 
Opportunity Funding Corporation (OFC) and its strategic partner, the Yale 
School of Management, led the project.  It brought together more than se-
venty experts on various aspects of the foreclosure crisis from think tanks, 
advocacy groups, government, and the housing industry.14  For six months, 
 
 11. I have had experience with one successful effort on the part of the federal govern-
ment in terms of receiving and acting on information from local practitioners.  The Moving-
To-Work (MTW) Program out of the Department of Housing and Urban Development pro-
vides certain high performing Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) flexibility in the use of 
their budget authority. See generally Moving to Work (MTW), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & UR-
BAN DEV., http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/mtw/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  I 
was the Deputy Director of the Housing Authority of New Haven when it secured MTW 
status. Id.  This program allows PHAs to identify local needs and address them in a timely 
way.  In a recent report to Congress, HUD acknowledges the rich opportunity for learning 
about what works (and what does not work) in meeting affordable housing needs across a 
large variety of localities. See EMILY CADIK & AMANDA NOGIC, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & UR-
BAN DEV., MOVING TO WORK: INTERIM POLICY APPLICATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF THE DEM-
ONSTRATION 56-65 (2010), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/mtw/ 
report-to-congress.pdf.  Relevant to this essay is the role that local lessons and collaborative 
policy deliberation had on the creation of this program.  Sunia Zaterman, the Executive Di-
rector of the Council of Large Public Housing Authorities (CLPHA), stated that “[t]he les-
sons learned under MTW are that locally designed programs, with input from stakeholders, 
can significantly improve lives and make better use of existing resources.” Press Release, 
Council of Large Pub. Hous. Auths., MTW: Platform for Effective Innovation (Sept. 20, 
2010), available at http://www.clpha.org/mtw_platform_for_effective_innovation?s=MTW. 
 12. For a more detailed description of this program, see generally Robin S. Golden & 
Sameera Fazili, Raising the Roof: Addressing the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis Through a 
Collaboration Between a City Government and a Law School Clinic, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 
29 (2009). 
 13. In our local experience in New Haven, the feedback loop to the state level was more 
successful. 
 14. OFC is a forty-year-old nonprofit organization focused on capital access and wealth 
generating methodologies for communities of color. See generally OPPORTUNITY FUNDING 
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the group distilled the lessons from local level work to design new and vet 
current proposals for stemming the crisis and rebuilding wealth in the hard-
est hit neighborhoods.  Knowing the needs of those on the ground and then 
considering those needs through multiple lenses resulted in recommenda-
tions that are informed, timely, and appropriate for implementation.  Again 
using the example of the role of counseling, the essay explores how this de-
liberative process used local experience to develop a robust set of policy 
recommendations for this area.  The group’s full set of recommendations 
was delivered to members of Congress and the Obama Administration on 
November 30, 2011.15 
I.  THE FALL AND RISE OF “LOCAL” IN THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 
The separation of local financial institutions from direct engagement 
with homebuyers has been a remarkable result of the changes to the home 
buying process that led to the mortgage foreclosure crisis. 
The home mortgage market in its traditional form, and when it worked 
well, was one in which personal relationships between parties involved in 
the transaction could trust one another and were constrained by laws 
created to combat discriminatory denials of credit. . . .  [T]his market ex-
perienced a radical transformation, and these personal relationships gave 
way to more impersonal transactions.16 
Think about the famous scene in It’s a Wonderful Life when only the 
movie’s hero George Bailey and the evil Mr. Potter stay calm when there is 
a run on the banks.17  George saves the Bailey Savings and Loan by ex-
plaining to the crowd of anxious depositors why he cannot give them all 
their money back right now. 
[Y]our money’s in Joe’s house, that’s right next to yours, and then the 
Kennedy House and Mrs. Macklin’s house and a hundred others.  Why, 
you’re lending them the money to build and then they’re going to pay it 
 
CORP., http://www.opportunityfundingcorporation.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  OFC’s 
Executive Director is Sharon Pratt, former Mayor of the District of Columbia. Id. 
 15. See OPPORTUNITY FUNDING CORP., OFC ECONOMIC STABILIZATION WHITE PAPER 
SERIES: RECOMMENDATIONS TO STEM THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND REBUILD WEALTH IN 
AMERICA’S COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (2010) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS], available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/News_&_Events/OFCWhitePaper.pdf. 
 16. Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the So-
cial Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 272 (2008). 
 17. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (RKO Pictures 1946). 
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back to you as best they can.  Now what are you going to do, foreclose on 
them?18 
George was describing a process that barely exists anymore (except per-
haps among community development financial institutions) where the local 
banker “knows” all, or at least most, of his (they were usually male) ac-
count holders.  The banks made the loans, serviced the loans, and worked 
directly with struggling homeowners to help them save their homes.  The 
point of this diversion is not to make the case that all mortgage-backed se-
curities are evil, but rather to point out how far a formerly local based 
process has moved away from its sense of place. 
One continuously evident facet of the national foreclosure crisis is that it 
has been an agglomeration of many local foreclosure and housing market 
crises.  Those familiar with the crises in their own regions, states, cities, 
and neighborhoods tend to have the best grasp of the nature of the prob-
lems occurring in their local housing and mortgage markets.  State hous-
ing finance agencies, which have been in the business of assisting modest-
income homebuyers in their respective states with access to sound, re-
sponsible mortgage credit, are among those with their fingers on the pulse 
of the local markets in their state.  Some of the obstacles in designing a 
nationally standardized foreclosure mitigation effort—such as those of the 
Bush Administration’s industry-led Hope Now effort or the Obama Ad-
ministration’s Home Affordability Modification Program (HAMP) initia-
tive—derive from the fact that they are not easily adapted to the particular 
needs of local communities and housing markets.19 
When the foreclosure crisis hit, servicers inundated with requests for 
modifications were understaffed and unprepared.20  But another problem 
with the current system is the physical separation between those “making 
decisions” and the homeowners, neighborhoods, and houses about which 
the decisions are being made.  Although much can be determined about a 
housing market by photographs, comparable sales, and other data collec-
tion; there is nothing that replaces local knowledge.  Anyone who has 
worked with the large servicers understands that the person negotiating 
 
 18. Id.  For a clip of the relevant scene from It’s A Wonderful Life, see NemoPublius, 
It’s A Wonderful Life Bank Run, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ 
Er69b4HMl8 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 19. Dan Immergluck, State Foreclosure Mitigation Strategies: A Comparison of Round 
1 and 2 Hardest Hit Fund Plans in States with Nonjudicial Foreclosure Processes 3 (Oct. 20, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695217. 
 20. To review how one mortgage servicer, Mortgage Modification Specialists, describes 
the changes that were required, see Loss Mitigation Turnaround Time, MORTG. MODIFICA-
TIONS SPECIALISTS, http://www.amnamortgage.com/loss_mitigation_turnaround_time.htm 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
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about the future of a particular house, on a particular street, in a particular 
neighborhood is likely to be hundreds, if not thousands, of miles away.21 
One example of the impact that this disconnect has had on hard hit 
neighborhoods is the treatment of renters in properties upon which the 
owner has been foreclosed.  The “standard” policy of servicers has been to 
evict tenants (even those who have been paying their rent on a timely basis) 
once the building has gone through foreclosure.  As described in an article 
prepared for the servicer industry, “[s]ervicers should recognize that . . . 
measures extending the eviction process will result in lower third party bids 
at a foreclosure sale when the property is tenant-occupied because the pur-
chaser may either have to pay more in a ‘cash for keys’ arrangement or see 
further diminution in value.”22 
These policies, set on a national basis by large servicers, were not volun-
tarily adjusted despite the obvious changes in local conditions.  Where fo-
reclosed houses would remain unsold for months (like many of the hardest 
hit areas in this crisis), the value of having a tenant23 remain in the house 
could mean the difference between the house being stripped of every valu-
able item (from the fixtures to the pipes) and the house retaining its maxi-
 
 21. To its credit, the Treasury Department recognized the need to allow for flexibility in 
meeting local needs when it developed the “Hardest Hit Fund” in February 2010. See Hous-
ing Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/housing-programs/hhf/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  In that way, it 
is similar to the successful Moving-To-Work (MTW) program discussed earlier, which pro-
vided public housing authorities with great flexibility in designing and funding programs 
(without any additional budget authority) and resulted in general lessons for use by all hous-
ing authorities. See supra note 11.  The Hardest Hit Fund provided additional funding to a 
number of the areas hardest hit by the crisis.  But, because regulatory flexibility was not 
provided, some states were restricted in how they could design their program.  Florida had 
to revise its proposal when two out of three of the elements were deemed ineligible. See, 
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATIONS—HFA 
HARDEST HIT FUND PROPOSAL (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ 
financial-stability/housing-programs/hhf/Documents/FL.pdf; see also Immergluck, supra 
note 19, at 6 n.4.  So far, and perhaps it is too soon to expect more, the programs have not 
revealed great successes. See, e.g., Gray Rohrer, Foreclosures Still Plague Florida: Sun-
shine State Had Second-Highest Number of Foreclosures in 2010, SUNSHINE NEWS (Jan. 14, 
2011), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/foreclosures-still-plague-florida (“The 
[Florida Hardest Hit Fund] program’s qualification requirements and the intransigence of 
mortgage providers, however, has led to a sputtering start.”). 
 22. Nanci L. Weissgold & Morey E. Barnes Yost, Make My Day: States Dare Services 
to Foreclose, K&L GATES NEWSSTAND (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.klgates.com/newsstand/ 
Detail.aspx?publication=5040. 
 23. Of course it has to be a “good” tenant, one who is paying rent regularly and is not 
causing any destruction to the unit. 
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mum value until resale.24  A local decision-maker, understanding the impli-
cations of emptying the house versus keeping a good tenant, would make 
the logical choice to keep the tenant.  Legislation that provides tenants with 
some protections has, to some extent, mitigated the negative effects of im-
mediately emptying a property of its tenants.25  Nevertheless, this practice 
has contributed to a significant loss of value in hard hit neighborhoods and 
has added to the negative impact on general quality of life.26 
In many ways, this crisis has shown the importance of the local in under-
standing solutions on the larger level.  It should not be surprising, then, that 
some of the most successful responses to the foreclosure crisis capitalized 
on local knowledge.  The efforts of Boston Community Capital (BCC) and 
its partners reflect just one example of successful local responses.27  Pio-
neer Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) like BCC 
purchase troubled mortgage notes and real estate owned (or “REOs”) for 
resale to owner-occupants.  By keeping owner-occupants in their homes, 
these programs reduce the stock of vacant properties, mitigate local forec-
losure spirals, and help rehabilitate neighborhoods.  They provide a neces-
sary complement to the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), which 
provides nonprofits with funding to purchase already vacant properties for 
resale to homebuyers.  Programs that prevent vacancies address a current 
gap in loss mitigation efforts in highly distressed communities where forec-
losures often occur, even when it is not the most economically efficient 
outcome.  These CDFIs conduct rigorous market research to identify and 
procure distressed assets from banks at discounts.  They help restructure 
mortgages more in line with current market values that existing homeown-
ers can afford.  With respect to homeowners with credit scores damaged in 
 
 24. In just one example from New Haven, a house that evicted all tenants upon foreclo-
sure was originally valued at $160,000 and, after being stripped of everything of value, sold 
for $16,000. 
 25. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1660, 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2009/fil09056a.pdf. 
 26. Gabe Treves, Banks Continue Mass Eviction of Tenants After Foreclosure, CAL. 
PROGRESS REP. (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/?q=node/ 
8403. 
 27. See Who We Are, BOSTON CMTY. CAPITAL, http://www.bostoncommunitycapital. 
org/who (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (“Boston Community Capital (BCC) is a community 
development financial institution whose mission is to build healthy communities where low-
income people live and work.  We accomplish this mission by investing in projects that pro-
vide affordable housing, good jobs, and new opportunities in low-income communities, 
connecting these neighborhoods to the mainstream economy.”).  BCC has been recognized 
for its strong innovative and successful locally-based responses to the crisis. Id.; PBS News 
Hour: Boston Firm Offers Homeowners a Second Chance After Foreclosure (PBS television 
broadcast Oct. 20, 2010) [hereinafter PBS News Hour], available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/bb/business/july-dec10/banker_10-20.html. 
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the crisis or who cannot immediately afford a new mortgage, there are pro-
grams that enable such homeowners to stay on as renters as they save to-
wards a down payment and the ultimate repurchase of the property.  For 
mortgage investors, offloading distressed mortgage notes and REOs can 
reduce the costs associated with loss mitigation efforts, lengthy foreclosure 
processes, and REO maintenance and disposition.  In addition to extensive 
direct experience with homeowners, BCC also uses focus groups with local 
at-risk homeowners to inform the development and refinement of BCC’s 
responses.  Through purchase of properties from banks and reestablishing 
the original owners in a new, affordable mortgage, BCC has saved more 
homes than have been saved in any other city in the country.28 
In New Haven, we worked to address the foreclosure crisis and learned 
quickly about how federal policies work on the ground and what obstacles 
prevent greater effectiveness of these policies. 
II.  EXPERIENCE AND EVIDENCE FROM NEW HAVEN 
The Community and Economic Development (CED) Clinic where I su-
pervise students is located is in a city, New Haven, with a rich history as a 
laboratory for the failures and successes of federal community development 
policies.  Under the federally funded urban renewal programs, designed to 
address the physical signs of poverty, entire swaths of neighborhood fabric 
were destroyed to build highways and modern office and residential build-
ings.  New Haven received more federal dollars per capita than any other 
city in the nation.29  The city still shows scars from that period of “invest-
ment.”  On a more positive note, New Haven has two successful HOPE VI 
projects that transformed the worst public housing developments in the 
city.  Further, New Haven just received a TIGER grant to start the process 
of “knitting-back together” the neighborhoods that were separated during 
urban renewal.30 
New Haven has had the same mayor and the same president of Yale 
University for over a decade.  The town-gown relationship, while never 
without its strains, is probably stronger now than at any other time in the 
 
 28. PBS News Hour, supra note 27 (remarks by David Grossman, Director of the Har-
vard Legal Aid Bureau). 
 29. Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 443, 
451 (2000) (“As of 1966, [New Haven] led the nation in per capita federal urban renewal 
funding, with $745 per person.  This was almost three times as much as any other city in the 
nation received.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 30. Alex Ihnen, New Haven Mayor Focuses on Reconnecting City, $16 Million Tiger 
Grant Awarded to Remove Highway, URBANSTL.COM (Oct. 15, 2010), http://urbanstl.com/ 
transportation/new-haven-mayor-focuses-on-reconnecting-city-16m-tiger-grant-awarded-to-
remove-highway. 
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city’s history.  It is not unusual for the mayor to reach out to Yale Law 
School clinics (most often the CED clinic) for help with particular issues.31  
This was also true in the fall of 2007 when Mayor John DeStefano asked 
our clinic to research the impending impact of the foreclosure crisis on 
New Haven and to help develop some proactive responses.  From this, the 
ROOF (Real Options, Overcoming Foreclosure) program was developed.32 
Although not one of the hardest hit areas like parts of Florida, Nevada, 
or California, the foreclosure crisis had and continues to have a significant 
impact on New Haven.  Foreclosures increased by 130 percent just between 
2005 and 2007.33  Initially, the foreclosures were associated with sub-prime 
mortgages and focused on several struggling low income neighborhoods.  
As the crisis worsened, problems spread to those with prime mortgages.  
That the highest number of homeowners seeking counseling occurred in the 
first quarter of 2010 reflects the continuing issues.34  The most devastating 
evidence of the lasting impact of this crisis on New Haven has been the 
enormous increase in vacant structures.  In 1996, there were 1500 vacant 
properties in New Haven.35  Through focused effort and resources, the city 
brought that figure down to a low of just 300 properties in 2007.36  As a re-
sult of the crisis, however, there was a jump of nineteen percent in 2008 
and a three-fold increase to 900 properties by 2010.37 
In beginning to formulate a response in New Haven, it was clear that no 
single entity (not the city, nor a particular non-profit service organization) 
could be successful alone.  The collaborative structure of ROOF, which 
 
 31. The mayor sought assistance on such issues as opposing the demutualization of New 
Haven Savings Bank, which resulted in funding to support a community development bank. 
See Robert Solomon, Law Students Nurture Low-Income Communities, CMTYS. & BANKING 
17, 18-19 (2010), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/commdev/c&b/2010/summer/ 
Solomon_YaleLaw_helps_communities.pdf.  The mayor also sought assistance on the de-
velopment of one of the nation’s first municipal resident identification cards. See Kaitlin 
Thomas, One Law Clinic, Two Cities, YALE L. REP. 40, 44 (2008), available at http://www. 
law.yale.edu/YLR/pdfs/v55-1/W08_clinic.pdf. 
 32. See Golden & Fazili, supra note 12, at 45-47. 
 33. See CMTY. & ECON. DEV. CLINIC OF YALE LAW SCHOOL, REPORT TO THE MAYOR OF 
THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN (2007) (on file with the Community and Economic Development 
Clinic).  Much of the analysis done was based upon data purchased from the Warren Group 
and information provided by RealtyTrac. See REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com 
/home (last visited Feb. 1, 2011); WARREN GROUP, http://www.thewarrengroup.com/portal 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2011).  This information continues to be tracked and updated by the 
ROOF Project. See generally ROOF PROJECT, http://www.theroofproject.org (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2011). 
 34. Memorandum from the ROOF Project, New Haven, to John DeStephano, Jr., 
Mayor, New Haven (Sept. 7, 2010) (on file with author). 
 35. ROOF Project, Funding Application 3 (May 2008) (on file with author). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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mirrors the collaborative structure of the OFC process discussed below, in-
cluded on-the-ground service organizations, city government, a local com-
munity development financial institution (CDFI), and the local law school 
clinic.38  The law school students researched best practices and successful 
legislative initiatives, feeding that information into the process of designing 
local solutions.  In turn, the collaborative participants, who worked on the 
front lines on a day to day basis, reported real time data on how servicers 
were responding, which servicers were being most cooperative, and which 
federal or state policies were and were not working.  And if they were not 
working, why?  Weekly executive committee meetings during the first two 
years enabled quick responses to new and changing needs. 
For illustrative purposes, I briefly discuss one example of local expe-
rience with obstacles not appropriately addressed on the federal level: the 
lack of adequate recognition and appropriate use of counseling.39 
III.  THE ROLE OF COUNSELING 
From the beginning, the key role of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) certified counselors was apparent to those trying to respond to the 
growing need for adequate recognition and appropriate use of counseling.40  
Also, it was clear early on that this critical resource, HUD certified counse-
 
 38. A valuable resource in ROOF and other local responses has been the engagement of 
law school clinics.  In the case of ROOF, the students provided essential research and up-
dated information on national best practices and legislative initiatives.  They analyzed com-
plex statutes, regulations, and contracts.  Other clinical programs involving students in fo-
reclosure response initiatives include the University of Baltimore School of Law; William 
Mitchell College of Law; Harvard Law School; American University, Washington College 
of Law; and Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. 
 39. The obstacles to appropriate servicer responses were obvious to us from an early 
stage.  Within just the first weeks of our regular ROOF meetings, we identified that servic-
ers were not properly staffed, did not have systems set up to keep track of documents, and 
the incentives were misaligned to get servicers to act quickly and appropriately.  We did 
everything we could on the local level.  We tried working with our local banking communi-
ty, but discovered that our local banks were not connected to a large number of local forec-
losures.  We wrote to trustees and were told that decisions were made by servicers.  The 
servicers hid behind what they said the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) allowed.  
Our students researched various bases for litigation, none of which seemed fruitful.  We 
contacted our federal representatives.  We even had a visit by Secretary Donovan in April of 
2009.  But the government continued to depend upon “carrots,” when it was obvious then, 
as it is now, that “sticks” were required. 
 40. As a reflection of how even HUD may not appreciate the importance of the HUD 
certified counselors in the loss mitigation process, I could not find a place on the HUD web-
site that provided general information on HUD certified counselors.  However, one of the 
HUD certified agencies provided a list of Frequently Asked Questions on its website. See 
Frequently Asked Questions About HUD Approved Housing Counseling, FEDERATION, 
http://www.natfed.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=1484 (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
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lors, was under-recognized by both state and federal actors.  In terms of 
collecting accurate information from at-risk homeowners, the key ROOF 
partner was (and is) Neighborhood Housing Services of New Haven 
(NHS).41  At the end of 2007, NHS had to turn its successful homeowner-
ship counseling center into a loss mitigation center.  At the heart of this ef-
fort was NHS’s team of HUD certified counselors.  Headed by HomeOw-
nership Center Managing Director, Bridgette Russell, the staff worked 
tirelessly to meet the growing demand, but also took time to share their in-
sights to help make New Haven’s comprehensive response effective and 
efficient. 
Counseling, when done right, makes a significant difference.42  What we 
discovered in practice was that, as much as possible, counseling interac-
tions should be done face to face and not over the telephone.  Modifications 
take time, and so multiple meetings are required.  Familiarity with the ser-
vicers, how they operate, who to talk to, and how to have successful inte-
ractions was key.  Russell and her staff understood these factors and, there-
fore, established procedures that would result in more successful 
modifications. 
These key elements of quality counseling were not made essential ele-
ments of the HOPE Hotline, the Bush Administration’s first attempt to 
meet the growing need of help for homeowners.43  When the HOPE Hot-
line was first announced, the ROOF project immediately geared the out-
reach efforts around it.  It soon became apparent, however, that local 
homeowners were not necessarily being directed to NHS.  Instead, they 
would be directed to any number of telephone-based counselors.  Home-
owners sent to these other counseling services would ultimately find their 
way to NHS after failing to obtain a modification.  After hearing about 
many such experiences, we made the decision to drop the HOPE Hotline 
number in our outreach.  Instead, we switched to using a hotline developed 
by the local United Way, which we knew would direct individuals to the 
 
 41. About NHS, NEIGHBORHOOD HOUS. SERVS. OF NEW HAVEN, 
http://www.nhsofnewhaven.org/about-nhs.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
 42. During the first year of the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling (NFMC) 
Program, NFMC-counseled homeowners were “about 1.6 times as likely to get out of forec-
losure, and avoid a foreclosure completion, than they would have been had they not received 
NFMC counseling.” NEIL MAYER ET AL., URBAN INST., NATIONAL FORECLOSURE MITIGA-
TION COUNSELING PROGRAM EVALUATION: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM EFFECTS, at 
vii-viii (2009), available at www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411982_NFMC_program_ 
evaluation.pdf. 
 43. For an early press release, see Press Release, Hope Now, 888-995-HOPE Hotline 
Receives Record Call Volume (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.fsround.org/hope_ 
now/pdfs/Hotlinefollowuprelease.pdf. 
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NHS counselors.44  Once we found this problem, we tried to report it to the 
director of the HOPE Hotline.  Although we did provide the feedback, we 
do not believe that it was ever used to make changes in the program design. 
We had more success in educating state officials about the importance of 
the HUD certified counseling network.  Connecticut was one of the first 
states to initiate legislation to create a court-sponsored foreclosure media-
tion program.45  This program, which has become a successful model for 
other states, was initially designed without awareness of the existing coun-
seling network.46  The ROOF project worked to educate those developing 
the program, introduce them to the counseling process, and train the initial 
mediators in how to work productively with counselors. 
The frustrations we experienced in trying to improve policy tools finally 
found an outlet in a unique effort to craft national solutions through local 
lessons learned.  Although it is not yet clear how we can use the White Pa-
per to make inroads in needed policy changes, the process itself was em-
powering.47  Further, connections made during this process will bear fruit 
in improving local responses to the foreclosure crisis. 
IV.  THE OPPORTUNITY FUNDING CORPORATION’S ECONOMIC 
STABILIZATION WHITE PAPER SERIES: A MODEL FOR INFORMING 
FEDERAL POLICY? 
In the late spring of 2010, the Opportunity Funding Corporation (OFC) 
organized a six-month dialogue series.  OFC was tasked with identifying 
the policy responses needed to stem foreclosures and regenerate economic 
activity in African-American and Hispanic-American communities hardest 
hit by the crisis.48  The OFC Economic Stabilization White Paper Series 
involved more than seventy experts on various aspects of the foreclosure 
crisis.49  OFC engaged the Yale School of Management (SOM), particular-
 
 44. See UNITED WAY OF CONN., http://www.infoline.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 45. An Act Concerning Responsible Lending and Economic Security, 2008, 2008 Conn. 
Acts 08-176 (providing responsible lending and economic security), available at http://www 
.cga.ct.gov/2008/ACT/PA/2008PA-00176-R00HB-05577-PA.htm. 
 46. See ALON COHEN & ANDREW JAKABOVICS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, NOW WE’RE 
TALKING: A LOOK AT CURRENT STATE-BASED FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS AND 
HOW TO BRING THEM TO SCALE 8 (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/2010/06/pdf/foreclosure_mediation.pdf. 
 47. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 48. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 49. Participating “Thought Leaders” included Congresswoman Maxine Waters, Con-
gressman Elijah Cummings, Congressman Gregory Meeks, as well as leaders from the Cen-
ter for Responsible Lending, the National Urban League, the National Community Rein-
vestment Coalition, the National Council of La Raza, NeighborWorks America, HUD, 
Goldman Sachs, and many other organizations. 
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ly Professor Constance Bagley, who had worked with OFC on prior 
projects.  In turn, Professor Bagley and Professor Stephen Hudspeth (who 
holds an appointment at both SOM and the Yale Law School) reached out 
to the Yale Law School’s CED clinic because of the clinic’s work in 
ROOF.  I, together with a core group,50 served an organizing role in prepar-
ing, researching, and writing the White Paper.51 
After a month of initial planning and research, OFC hosted a day-long 
summit on Capitol Hill on July 27, 2010.52  We heard from over fifty par-
ticipants, including representatives of non-profit organizations doing both 
direct work related to the crisis and advocacy work.  We had representa-
tives from community financial institutions, academia, policy makers, 
members of Congress, and governmental officials.  At the end of that event, 
the participants were divided into working groups,53 and a series of follow-
up conference calls were held for each working group.  Additional experts 
were identified and invited to participate to address particular aspects of the 
work.  Participants vetted and discussed multiple drafts of recommenda-
tions.  More research was done in response to questions raised.  In the end, 
after hours of deliberation and refinement, the White Paper draft was com-
pleted.  Another level of participants then vetted it again to prepare the fi-
nal draft.  It was formally presented to members of Congress and the Ob-
ama Administration on November 30, 2010.  Below, I elaborate on a few of 
the major recommendations presented in the White Paper to illustrate how 
this collaborative deliberation promoted effective policy recommenda-
tions.54 
 
 50. Constance E. Bagley, Professor in the Practice of Law and Management, Yale 
School of Management (SOM); James Carr, CBO, National Community Reinvestment Coa-
lition; Stephen Hudspeth, Lecturer at Yale Law School and SOM; and Sharon Pratt, Mon-
day Raquel Webb, Joid Samuda, and Carolyn Bowden from OFC.  SOM graduate John 
Rooney and Yale Law School student Caroline Novogrod served as rapporteurs of multiple 
working group meetings and the two summits, and were the co-editors of the White Paper. 
 51. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15. 
 52. OPPORTUNITY FUNDING CORP., ECONOMIC STABILIZATION WHITE PAPER SERIES (July 
27, 2010), available at http://www.ncnw.org/images/white_paper_strategy.pdf. 
 53. Id.  The initial working groups were: (1) Net Worth Implications of Foreclosure and 
Methodologies to Mitigate the Crisis; (2) Post-Crisis Recommendations for Promoting Ho-
meownership; (3) Post-Crisis Recommendations—Wealth Creation; and (4) Business Op-
portunities Emanating from the Foreclosure Crisis/Ensuring Minority Business Participa-
tion.  Through the course of the deliberations, the format and structure of White Paper 
changed to reflect the consensus on priorities. 
 54. All of the recommendations are so important that I had trouble picking just a few on 
which to focus.  I chose to emphasize the counseling system, the same focus I used in the 
section discussing New Haven-based work, to carry a thread through the whole essay.  
However, I want to mention two other areas I believe are particularly critical and should re-
ceive attention: (1) the recommendations to promote principal reductions; and (2) the rec-
ommendations to find innovative ways to engage servicers, so that properties are “right-
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V.  SUPPORTING AND EXPANDING THE COUNSELING PROCESS 
One of the key observations of the White Paper, which was echoed over 
and over by those working most directly with at-risk homeowners, was re-
cognizing what works and supporting those efforts.55  As reflected in one 
of the White Paper’s key recommendations,56 the essential role of HUD 
certified counselors57 should be recognized and adequately supported.  It is 
essential to identify first what successful loss mitigation counseling looks 
like (i.e., face-to-face, in-depth, and with follow-through).  Not surprising-
ly, and as discussed in the section on ROOF above, our experience in New 
Haven strongly supported this area of recommendations.  Not all processes 
that fall under the broad category of loss mitigation counseling provide 
successful outcomes for homeowners.  Successful counseling is time-
intensive and expensive, so appropriate resources must be dedicated (or 
other funding mechanisms—such as contributions by the private sector—
developed). 
More can also be done to ensure that at risk homeowners access existing 
services.  In its May 2010 report to Congress, NeighborWorks America, 
which manages the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling (NFMC) 
program, indicated that more than one in five homeowners reaching out to 
NFMC-funded counseling agencies were already over one hundred twenty 
days delinquent.58  The National Community Reinvestment Coalition 
 
sized” financially and eligible homeowners are kept in place, avoiding more vacancies and 
destabilization of neighborhoods. 
 55. Among the thought leaders who contributed to discussions around the role of hous-
ing counselors were Lautaro Diaz, Vice-President, Housing and Community Development 
of National Council of La Raza; Graciela Aponte, Legislative Analyst, National Council of 
La Raza; Larry Gilmore, President & CEO, HOPE LoanPort; Marcia Griffin, President, 
HomeFree-USA; Marietta Rodriguez, National Director of Home Ownership Programs 
NeighborWorks America; and Peter Tatian, Senior Research Associate, the Urban Institute. 
 56. The fourth recommendation of the White Paper states: “INCREASE the reach of 
housing counselors to help distressed homeowners to avoid foreclosure when possible. 
Going forward, implement counseling programs to promote financial literacy for prospec-
tive homebuyers and to ensure that they will not fall victim to unscrupulous lending practic-
es.” See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 3. 
 57. As has been noted by many advocates, there are many times when counseling is in-
sufficient and legal assistance is needed.  In New Haven we are just beginning to work on 
how to meet this need, either by expanding assistance to the foreclosure defendant’s bar or 
by working with the court system on supporting pro se litigants.  Because the legal land-
scape for foreclosures is state-specific, the federal government can only provide general 
support such as funding for legal assistance.  There were and are, however, significant ways 
that the federal government could be supporting the efforts of HUD-certified counselors in 
navigating the modification process with servicers and partnering with local legal resources. 
 58. NEIGHBORWORKS AM., NATIONAL FORECLOSURE MITIGATION COUNSELING PRO-
GRAM CONGRESSIONAL UPDATE: ACTIVITY THROUGH JANUARY 31, 2010, at 46 (2010), avail-
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(NCRC) found that homeowners who are severely delinquent or already in 
foreclosure are significantly less likely to receive Home Affordable Mod-
ification Program (HAMP) modifications.59  Still others fall victim to frau-
dulent “rescue” scams. Innovative multimedia campaigns and education 
programs, as called for in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), could raise homeowner awareness 
of local programs, help persuade homeowners that seeking unbiased coun-
seling is worthwhile, and alert homeowners to scams.  Local partnerships 
between nonprofits and television networks would help housing counselors 
reach key demographics efficiently.  Multi-lingual public service an-
nouncements, advertisements in local newspapers, and inserts in servicers’ 
mail to homeowners will increase the probability that homeowners turn to 
their local counseling centers when first facing default. 
Another important way of expanding on what works is to strengthen the 
tools that already exist for homeowners and the counselors (and attorneys) 
that are helping them.60  Even in places like New Haven, where homeown-
ers had access to the best quality HUD certified counseling through Neigh-
borhood Housing Services of New Haven, the federal government could 
have and should have provided additional tools to counselors by streng-
thening oversight of its own policies and programs.  All White Paper par-
ticipants agreed that HAMP has had limited success.  Even the govern-
ment’s own accounting office found that the program relies too much on 
guidelines and not enough on compliance oversight.61  Setting guidelines 
for servicers without providing recourse for homeowners does not work.  
 
able at http://www.nw.org/network/nfmcp/documents/CongressionalReportandAppendices 
.pdf. 
 59. NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., HAMP MORTGAGE MODIFICATION SURVEY 
2010, at 3 (2010), available at http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter_reports/ 
hamp_report_2010.pdf.  NCRC’s 2010 survey of almost two hundred distressed homeown-
ers found that  
50 percent of those who had a foreclosure pending and 70 percent of those who 
had a foreclosure judgment received no modification on their loan, compared to 
25 percent of respondents who were current on their mortgage.  Also, 43.7 percent 
of the respondents that were delinquent on their mortgage payment received no 
modification. 
Id. at 10. 
 60. The third recommendation of the White Paper states: “STRENGTHEN oversight of 
servicers participating in the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and other 
government foreclosure mitigation programs by creating an independent office to oversee 
compliance and by giving rejected homeowners access to an appeals process.” See RECOM-
MENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 3. 
 61. In its June 2010 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office detailed several 
shortcomings in U.S. Department of the Treasury’s oversight of servicers and servicers’ 
treatment of borrowers. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8. 
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The White Paper strongly urges the expedited implementation of relevant 
provisions of Dodd-Frank. 
An important way to support homeowners and their advocates would be 
to create the Office of the Homeowner Advocate (OHA) to help resolve 
problems with servicers.  This recommendation received strong support 
from the White Paper deliberators.  Having a dedicated advocacy office 
within the government would go a long way toward ensuring that the recur-
ring problems encountered with servicers can be quickly identified and ad-
dressed.  This would institutionalize the kind of feedback loop that this es-
say recommends.  HAMP loan modification denials would be appealable to 
OHA.  Based on feedback from homeowners, housing counselors, and 
housing lawyers, OHA could work to identify systematic issues obstructing 
modifications and to alert relevant agencies.  Most importantly, this office 
would provide homeowners with access to a formal appeals process.  Re-
cent changes in HAMP require servicers to provide homeowners with more 
information on the basis for their rejection, but homeowners remain power-
less to challenge a denial—even if the denial is made in error. 
I have just touched on one area explored in the White Paper.  I hope that 
this small sample both encourages the reader to spend time reading the en-
tire White Paper and draws attention to why I believe this process holds 
promise for informing policy on the federal level. 
CONCLUSION 
By early 2008, local actors responding to the foreclosure crisis had al-
ready encountered many of the major obstacles that are now known by the 
average consumer from news about this continuing crisis.  These insights, 
voiced to Congress and the federal government in a variety of ways, did not 
affect significant or timely changes to federal policy.  There was, and con-
tinues to be, a disconnect between local experience and national policy-
making. 
It is a challenge to develop a dependable, robust feedback loop to federal 
policymakers.  This essay suggests both that local experience is critical to 
timely and effective adjustments to policy and that collaborative, delibera-
tive processes that build from local experience are possible.  The OFC 
Economic Stabilization White Paper62 provides a comprehensive roadmap 
for action, identifying both successful aspects of existing policies and addi-
tional new policies.  The author suggests that examining local lessons 
through this kind of collaborative deliberation contributes to higher quality 
 
 62. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 15, at 3. 
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proposals.63  Engaging a wide variety of actors, some of whom come with 
direct and relevant experiences of implementing policies and others with a 
sophisticated analysis of the problem, can produce a whole that is greater 
than the sum of its parts.  In the case of the OFC White Paper, there was a 
high level of consensus achieved across participants.64  To improve the ef-
ficacy of federal policies, governmental actors should find ways to proac-
tively employ such collaborative processes.  Particularly in the case of an 
urgent problem like the foreclosure crisis, government must find reliable 
ways to assess and quickly adjust policies.  A collaborative deliberation 
that engages lessons learned from actual implementation could provide just 
the kind of process that is needed. 
 
 63. Id. at 9-10.  I have also seen the emergence of this same kind of informed, collabora-
tive deliberation around developing strategies to reform the 2012 Farm Bill.  After attending 
a recent two day summit on the topic, I am convinced that current efforts to reform the farm 
bill will be enhanced by the information sharing and consensus building that is occurring as 
a result of these collaborative efforts, despite the fact that no one expects any increase in 
funding. See NAT’L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL., THE ROAD TO REFORM: 2012 FARM BILL 
SUMMIT (2010), available at http://sustainableagriculture.net/our-work/meetings/farm-bill-
summit/; see also NAT’L POL’Y & LEGAL ANALYSIS NETWORK TO PREVENT CHILDHOOD OB-
ESITY, FARM BILL 2010: BUILDING COALITIONS FOR CHANGE (2010), available at http://www 
.nplanonline.org/sites/phlpnet.org/files/YaleFarmBIll2012FINALWEB.pdf (arguing that the 
Obama administration should engage directly with groups like this to benefit from the expe-
rience-based analysis). 
 64. Many participants reflected on being surprised at both how comprehensive the rec-
ommendations were and how well they covered the issues. 
